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FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
CONSIDER SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS
LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS
I.

Introduction

In October, 1989, the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA or
the Association) created a Special Committee to Consider Sanctions
for Frivolous Litigation in New York State Courts (the Committee).
The chair of the Committee is former Court of Appeals Judge Hugh
R. Jones. A list of the Committee's members is set forth in Appendix
A.
The members of the Committee have brought varied backgrounds
and experiences to the Committee's work. It was the Association's
intent to constitute a Committee representative of lawyers in New
York State.
The Committee was formed in response to a request by the Commercial and Federal Litigation Section of the Association. That Section had studied the use of sanctions in the New York State courts.
The primary focus of that study was Part 130 of the Uniform Rules
for the New York State Trial Courts (Part 130), implemented on January 1, 1989, which permits the award of costs and the imposition of
financial sanctions for frivolous conduct in civil litigation.
Part 130 was the subject of legislative attention during 1989. At the
1989 legislative session which ended on July 1, 1989, the Assembly
passed a bill in the closing days which would have suspended the operation of Part 130 (A. 3521). The Senate failed to act on the companion bill (S. 3887) before the session ended, reportedly because
"[s]enate leaders blocked a vote in the upper house," N.Y.L.J., July 5,
1989, at 2, col. 3.
The bills provided that during the period of suspension the subject
of frivolous litigation would be studied by a temporary state commission. Further efforts to create such a commission and to suspend the
court rules during the period of the study were expected in the current
session of the Legislature.
The Commercial and Federal Litigation Section recognized the desirability of further study in this area and proposed that the Association constitute a representative committee to review the operation of
the rules providing for sanctions against frivolous litigation and to
consider proposals for improvement. In response to that proposal,
Association President John J. Yanas appointed the Special Committee. The general objective of the Committee was to study and recom-
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mend appropriate means for addressing problems caused by abusive
conduct in the courts of New York State. The text of the Committee's charge is set forth in Appendix B.
II.

The Committee's Activities

The Committee first met on November 30, 1989. Thereafter, the
Committee sent a letter to county and local bar association presidents
in New York State inviting written comments by their associations on
the topic of addressing problems caused by frivolous conduct, including the question of when sanctions should be imposed as well as the
substantive and procedural form they should take. The Committee
also sent letters to all New York State judges, inviting written comments on the same issues. In addition, the Committee invited written
comments from members of interested NYSBA sections (Insurance,
Negligence and Compensation Law; Commercial and Federal Litigation; and Trial Lawyers) and committees (Civil Practice Law and
Rules; County Courts; Judicial Administration; Medical Malpractice;
Supreme Courts; and Tort Reparations).
The Committee mailed a hearing notice relating to public hearings
to be conducted by the Committee. Recipients of the hearing notice
included members of the NYSBA House of Delegates, NYSBA section and committee chairs, county and local bar associations (including women's, specialty and ethnic bars), as well as selected
newspapers in all regions of the State.
Thus, the Committee mailed letters directly to more than 12,000
lawyers and judges expressing its interest in their views on these matters. Many additional lawyers and others were afforded an opportunity to comment through local and county bar associations and at
public hearings.
To obtain data regarding similar statutes and rules in other states,
the Committee sent letters to the Law Digest Revisers for MartindaleHubbell in the other 49 states and arranged for the mailing of a memorandum to executive directors of other state bar associations
throughout the United States. In response to its solicitations, the
Committee received written comments from 147 organizations and
individuals. The Committee also conducted a public hearing in New
York City on February 9, 1990. An acknowledgement and listing of
those who either responded to the Committee's survey or testified at
the public hearing is set forth in Appendix C.
The Committee received and considered voluminous materials
from the Law Digest Revisers for Martindale-Hubbell. A chart setting forth data on sanctions furnished by other jurisdictions is set
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forth in Appendix D. The Committee also considered numerous judicial decisions regarding sanctions.
Finally, the Committee considered an extensive study by the Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association on
Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees, issued in June 1987. That report surveyed the experiences and attitudes, regarding the provision for sanctions in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 11), of
a broad spectrum of the practitioners, as well as the judges, in the
federal courts in New York. Detailed questionnaires were mailed to
approximately 8,000 lawyers and to every federal judicial officer in
New York State. As part of that study, the responses of 1,414 lawyers
and 43 judges to the questionnaires were obtained and analyzed by
computer.
The Committee met over the weekend of February 24-25, 1990 and
on March 12, 1990. The Committee now respectfully submits its
Report.
III. Recommendations
The Committee believes that in adopting Part 130, the New York
State courts acted appropriately and took a significant step in the
right direction. Nevertheless, the Committee recommends that Part
130 be modified in several significant ways. The major changes proposed are set forth in Section A of this part of the Report.
Most of the proposed revisions stem from the Committee's view
that the focus of Part 130 should be on abusive conduct rather than
on frivolous pleadings. The other major changes stem from the Committee's belief that the purpose of Part 130 should be deterrence, with
fee-shifting the appropriate deterrent mechanism, rather than punitive
sanctions.
Section B of this part of the Report contains the text of revised Part
130. The text of current Part 130 indicating the Committee's revisions
thereto is set forth in Appendix E. An analysis of the proposed
changes and an exposition of the reasons for the changes is set forth in
Section C of this part of the Report.
A.

Summary of Recommendations

1. The caption for Part 130, "Costs: Sanctions," should be replaced with "Costs for Abusive Conduct."
2. The second sentence of current § 130-1.1(a), which provides
that financial sanctions may be imposed in lieu of awarding costs,
should be deleted.
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3. Current § 130-1.1(c), which defines frivolous conduct, should
be amended in two respects:
a. Subpart (i), which was patterned on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, should be deleted.
b. Subpart (ii) should be revised to incorporate omissions, as well as abusive acts.
4. § 130-1.2, which details the requirements for orders awarding
costs, should be amended in two respects:
a. The section should require courts to set forth in writing the particulars of the conduct undertaken which violated
Part 130, and the particulars justifying the amount of costs
awarded.
b. The cap of $10,000 should be eliminated.
5. Current § 130-1.3, which pertains to payment of sanctions,
should be deleted.
6. Additional Recommendations:
a. The Office of Court Administration should monitor
the operation of Part 130 to determine its effectiveness and
to identify problems.
b. An appropriate unit within the New York State Bar
Association should be designated to receive comments of
practicing attorneys and to monitor the operation of Part
130 to determine its effectiveness and to identify problems.
c. The Legislature should consider repealing N.Y. Civ.
Prac. L & R. § 8303-a (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1990)
(CPLR) as ineffective and inconsistent with the thrust of
amended Part 130.
B. Text of Proposed Revision of Part 130
UNIFORM RULES - TRIAL COURTS
§ 130-1.1 - Costs for Abusive Conduct.

(a) The court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except
where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for
actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorneys' fees,
resulting from abusive conduct as defined in this Part. This Part
shall not apply to town or village courts, to proceedings in a small
claims part of any court, or to proceedings in the Family Court
commenced under Article 3, 7, 8 or 10 of the Family Court Act.
(b) The court, as appropriate, may make such award of costs,
against either an attorney or a party to the litigation or against
both. Where the award is against an attorney, it may be against
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the attorney personally or upon a partnership, firm, corporation,
government agency, prosecutor's office, legal aid society or public
defender's office with which the attorney is associated and that has
appeared as attorney of record. The award may be imposed upon
any attorney appearing in the action or upon a partnership, firm or
corporation with which the attorney is associated.
(c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is abusive if it is undertaken or omitted primarily to delay or prolong unreasonably the
resolution of the litigation or to harass or maliciously injure another, and may include the making of a motion for costs under this
section. In determining whether the conduct in question is abusive,
the court shall consider whether the conduct was continued after
its impropriety was apparent or should have been apparent to
counsel.
(d) An award of costs may be made either upon motion in
compliance with CPLR 2214 or 2215 or upon the court's own initiative, after a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The form of the
hearing shall depend upon the nature of the conduct and the circumstances of the case.
§ 130-1.2 - ORDER AWARDING COSTS.
The court may make an award of costs only upon a written decision setting forth the particulars of the conduct on which the
award is based, the reasons why the court found the conduct to be
abusive, and the reasons why the court found the amount awarded
to be appropriate. An award of costs shall be entered as a judgment of the court.
§ 130-1.3 - APPLICATION TO OFFICERS OTHER THAN JUDGES OF
THE COURTS OF THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM.

The powers of a court set forth in this Part shall apply to judges
of the Housing Part of the New York City Civil Court and to hearing examiners appointed pursuant to section 439 of the Family
Court Act, except that the powers of Family Court hearing examiners shall be limited to a determination that a party or attorney
has engaged in abusive conduct, which shall be subject to confirmation by a judge of the Family Court who may impose any costs
authorized by this Part.
§ 130-1.4 - EXCEPTION.
This rule shall not apply to requests for costs or attorneys fees
subject to the provisions of CPLR 8303-a.
C.

Analysis of Recommendations and Proposed Revisions

Two overriding concerns support the Committee's recommendations. First, the Committee believes that the current formulation may
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unnecessarily chill access to the New York State courts without
preventing the conduct that actually causes needless expense and delay. Accordingly, the Committee's recommendations for change are
designed to avoid the chilling of access problems presented by sanctions rules.
Second, the Committee is concerned with insuring that the revised
rule serve to deter the type of conduct that causes such expense and
delay, without creating the risk of arbitrary punishment. The Committee therefore recommends that the persons harmed by such conduct be compensated for their incurred expenses, including attorneys
fees. Such cost shifting is not subject to arbitrary application as the
provision for payment of sanctions may be.
Before analyzing the text of the revised Part 130, it is important to
place the Committee's recommendations in a larger context. The
Committee found no empirical or other data to suggest that the
problems confronting the New York State courts are caused by the
bringing of frivolous complaints or other pleadings.' Rather, almost
all indications are that excessive costs and delay are caused by abusive
litigation practices. Accordingly, the focus of revised Part 130 is on
abusive conduct, and not on the merits of pleadings filed.
Commentators critical of Part 130 and of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, which became the model for Part 130, speak eloquently
of the need to prevent the chilling of access to courts. Indeed, every
empirical study of Rule 11 undertaken to date suggests that Rule 11
may have a chilling effect on the bringing of novel claims and
theories.2
Access to the court system is a basic tenet of the American legal
and historical tradition. A sanctions provision which exerts a chilling
influence on creative counsel does violence to this tradition. The
sanction of dismissal or the denial of relief by the court is a sufficient
safeguard. Indeed, in our common law tradition, it is bad public policy to provide judges with a tool that would permit them not only to
1. The fact that CPLR 8303-a has only been invoked twice in the reported cases
suggests that problems other than frivolous filings were the cause of the medical malpractice crisis. Similarly, only a handful of the cases applying Part 130 that the Committee
collected involved sanctions for a frivolous pleading.
2. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself In the Foot Looking for a Middle
Groundon Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383 (1990); Burbank, Rule 11 in Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y (1989); Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO
L.R. 485 (1989); La France, FederalRule 11 and PublicInterest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L.
REV. 331 (1988); Vairo, Rule 11, A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988); Nelken,
Sanctions Under Amended FederalRule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle
Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986).
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dismiss an action, but also to sanction the losers when in their view
the claims or theories were frivolous. At the very least, a rule that
may chill access to courts should be adopted, if at all, by the legislature, not the courts themselves.
By deleting § 130-1.1 (c)(i), which raises the access questions, from
the rule, any question of the Office of Court Administration's (OCA's)
jurisdiction to adopt the rule is eliminated. The access to courts question is for the New York State Legislature to decide. On the other
hand, the daily operation and administration of the New York courts,
including the control of abusive conduct, is properly a function of the
OCA. The proposed rule, which focuses only on conduct, is therefore
properly within the OCA's jurisdiction. Indeed, it is preferable for a
rule aimed at preventing abusive conduct to be adopted by the OCA,
which can monitor the rule and has the flexibility to make appropriate
revisions.
The following commentary describes and explains the proposed revisions to the text of Part 130.
§ 130-1.1

Costs for Abusive Conduct
The words in the caption for Part 130, "Costs: Sanctions," have
been replaced with "Costs for Abusive Conduct." The caption would
then reflect the scope and underlying purpose of the rule, to combat
abusive conduct. The word "Sanctions" is eliminated and the word
"Costs" is maintained, because, as will be explained below, the Committee recommends that only costs in the form of reasonably incurred
expenses and attorney's fees may be awarded under the rule.
-

§ 130-1.1 (a)
The Committee proposes that § 130-1.1(a) be revised to provide:
(a) The court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except
where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for
actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorneys' fees,
resulting from abusive conduct as defined in this Part. This Part
shall not apply to town or village courts, to proceedings in a small
claims part of any court, or to proceedings in the Family Court
commenced under Article 3, 7, 8 or 10 of the Family Court Act.
There are no changes in the first sentence except for replacing the
phrase "frivolous conduct" with "abusive conduct" in accord with
the overall change in the emphasis of the rule.
The second sentence of current § 130-1.1(a), which provides that
financial sanctions may be imposed in lieu of awarding costs, is deleted. The provision for allowing "costs in the form of reimbursement
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for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's
fees, resulting from abusive conduct" is a sufficient deterrent and also
has the benefit of reimbursing the party victimized by the abusive
conduct.
Abusive conduct also may harm the court system and other litigants needing judicial intervention because of the delay engendered.
The Committee considered whether punitive sanctions or monetary
fines beyond or in lieu of reimbursement for costs were desirable or
needed to deter abusive conduct. For several reasons, the Committee
decided that such sanctions were neither desirable nor necessary.
Punitive fines raise several problems. It is difficult to measure or
quantify what an appropriate sanction should be. First, the value of a
court's time is hard to measure. Given the difficulties in quantification, some judges may resort to subjective factors and assert their authority by imposing unjustifiably large fines. Moreover, as a matter of
public policy, it is the function of judges to rule on the legitimacy of
actions or motions, and fines should not attach to using the system.
Second, litigants "waiting in line" also may be damaged by abusive
conduct. However, it is difficult to measure what their damages
would be. Moreover, the payment of a fine to the Clients' Security
Fund does not speed up the line nor compensate the litigants. In addition, more effective remedies, such as the power to enjoin repetitive
abuses, exist to combat abuses such as the refiling of meritless claims. 3
Reimbursement in the form of actual and reasonable expenses will
provide a sufficient deterrent to abusive conduct so that punitive sanctions should be unnecessary. The Committee also proposes that the
$10,000 cap on costs be eliminated. The prospect of full cost-shifting
should make lawyers think twice about engaging in abusive conduct.
No changes are proposed to the third sentence. Thus, the applicability of Part 130 remains the same.
§ 130-1.1(b)
The Committee proposes that § 130-1.1(b) be revised to read:
(b) The court, as appropriate, may make such award of costs,
against either an attorney or a party to the litigation or against
both. Where the award is against an attorney, it may be against
the attorney personally or upon a partnership, firm, corporation,
government agency, prosecutor's office, legal aid society or public
3. Muka v. NYS Bar Ass'n, 120 Misc. 2d 897, 466 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct.
Tompkins County 1983); Muka v. Hancock, Estabrook, Ryan, Shove & Hust, 120 Misc.
2d 146, 465 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1983); Muka and Deubler v. Pollack (Sup. Ct. Otsego County December 29, 1989) (op. unavailable); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT.
ACT § 1810 (McKinney 1963).
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defender's office with which the attorney is associated and that has
appeared as attorney of record. The award may be imposed upon
any attorney appearing in the action or upon a partnership, firm or
corporation with which the attorney is associated.
The only changes made to this subsection are to conform the language. Accordingly, the phrases referring to the imposition of sanctions are deleted.
The Committee recommends that Part 130 awards of costs continue to be made against either the attorney, the party or both. It is
contemplated that most awards will be imposed against the attorney.
Most decisions as to tactics and motions are made by lawyers, and
clients often will have no basis for determining whether the attorney's
tactic is improper.
The Committee believes, however, that the option of making an
award against the client, or the attorney and client, should be preserved. In some cases, a client knowingly will instruct the attorney to
go forward with improper conduct, such as filing a motion to delay or
harass an adversary.
The revised subsection preserves the option of making the award
against an attorney, or upon the attorney's partnership, firm, corporation, government agency, prosecutor's office, legal aid society or public defender's office with which the attorney is associated.4 Especially
with the elimination of the $10,000 cap, allowing the award to be
against the entity as well as the attorney will insure maximum deterrence. The rule will encourage the entity to monitor more carefully
the practices of the attorneys associated with the entity.
Part 130 awards are not dependent on the signing of a paper as is
the case with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.- Under the Civil
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), papers may be signed by the party
or signed in the name of a firm, rather than the individual attorney
who caused the paper to be prepared. In addition, because Part 130 is
aimed at conduct, and more than one attorney may be involved in the
litigation, it is appropriate to allow the award to be made against the
entity. Permitting the award to be against the entity may also avoid
the sometimes difficult task of determining exactly which attorney
was responsible for the abusive conduct or course of conduct.
4. In contrast, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, only a party signing a pleading may be
sanctioned. See Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
5. Because the focus of Part 130 is on abusive conduct rather than on the frivolousness or merits of a paper filed or served, the Committee decided that importing the signing requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is inappropriate.
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§ 130-1.1(c)
The Committee proposes that § 130-1.1(c) be revised to provide:
(c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is abusive if it is undertaken or omitted primarily to delay or prolong unreasonably the
resolution of the litigation or to harass or maliciously injure another, and may include the making of a motion for costs under this
section. In determining whether the conduct in question is abusive, the court shall consider whether the conduct was continued
after its impropriety was apparent or should have been apparent to
counsel.
This is the heart of Part 130. This subsection, which defines frivolous conduct, has been completely rewritten. First, the subpart now
defines "abusive conduct" rather than "frivolous conduct." The word
"abusive" more clearly defines the type of objectionable conduct that
ought to be deterred. While the word "abusive" may have some subjective content, the word generally connotes wrongdoing. The word
"frivolous" merely connotes wrongheaded. Wrongdoing should be
deterred. The process of winning and losing takes ample care of the
wrongheaded.
Subpart (i), which was patterned on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, is deleted. The subpart was designed to incorporate an objective test by defining "frivolous" with phrases such as "completely
without merit" and "reasonable argument." The circularity of the
definition, however, inevitably leads to and invites subjective decisionmaking. Any rule that employs the word "frivolous" necessarily
raises the problem of chilling because that word is inherently subjective and ultimately is dependent on one's view of the merits of the
pleading or motion. While Part 130-1.1 (c)(i) expressly6 and Rule 11
implicitly7 both sought to cloak the concept of frivolous in objective
dress, by immunizing from sanctions all papers supported by a reasonable argument, such attempts may ultimately fail to prevent the
problem of chilling because of disputes about whether such arguments
are reasonable or not.'
6. (c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is frivolous if:
(i) it is completely without merit in law or fact and cannot be supported by
reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.
7. The full text of Rule 11 is set forth in Appendix F. Although the word "frivolous" does not appear in Rule 11, many courts applying the rule use a frivolous test in
determining whether sanctions must be imposed. Hudson v. Moore Business Forms,
Inc., 836 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 898 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1990); Kramer,
Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel v. Aronoff, 638 F. Supp. 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
8. For example, if Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), were filed in
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Indeed, the Committee considered and rejected several reformulations of such standards and found all of them unacceptable in light of
the problem of chilling of access.
Moreover, it is unnecessary to focus on the merits of pleadings in
Part 130. As Part 130, even as currently formulated, suggests, the
problem is conduct. However, as currently drafted, Part 130 raises
the same chilling effect problem as Rule 11 because it uses the word
"frivolous," rather than the word "abusive," to define objectionable
conduct. More important than the question of meritless claims and
theories is the problem of lawyers misbehaving in the conduct of depositions, motion practice, and in the courtroom; and the filing or serving of repetitive motions or pleadings. Equally of concern is the
failure of lawyers to respond to court orders, discovery requests, or
conferences.
Accordingly, the provision currently incorporated in subpart (c)(ii)
has been revised to apply to omissions, as well as abusive acts. The
first sentence of subpart (c) now provides that "conduct is abusive if it
is undertaken or omitted primarily to delay or prolong unreasonably
the resolution of the litigation or to harass or maliciously injure another, and may include the making of a motion for costs under this
section."
The word "primarily" is retained. The Committee believed that
using the word "solely," which is used in CPLR § 8303-a, would undermine the effectiveness of the rule because it would be too difficult
to prove or find sufficient evidence. In addition, the word "solely"
may provide an avenue of escape for the unscrupulous lawyer seeking
to cloak misconduct with a minimal element of propriety. Retaining
the word "primarily" is more workable, and has the advantage of allowing the court to deal leniently with an inadvertent offender while
being able to take effective action against the deliberate or repeat violator. Using the word "primarily" allows the court to infer that the
conduct was abusive under the circumstances.
Under the proposed rule, the mere filing of a frivolous pleading
would not ordinarily constitute the basis for an award. However, if it
becomes apparent after the filing that there is no factual basis whatsoever for the pleading, the expense of the litigation attributable to that
the wake of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and the amended version of Rule 11
were in existence, there would be a great risk that a federal judge would be required to
sanction the plaintiff filing the action. In some cases, sanctions have been reversed because an appellate court has found that the lower court not only should not have imposed
sanctions, but also wrongly decided the issue on the merits against the party sanctioned.
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
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pleading may be shifted from that point on. Under these circumstances, the lack of any factual basis for the pleading would permit the
court to find that the party filing the pleading had persisted in pursuing it for one of the purposes identified in § 130-1.1 (c) of the proposed
rule.
The subsection makes clear that abusive motions for costs are also
subject to the rule. It is necessary to make this clear to avoid the
problem of satellite and abusive sanctions motions that are endemic in
the federal courts under Rule 11.
§ 130-1. 1(d)
The Committee proposes that § 130-1.1(d) be changed to read:
(d) An award of costs may be made either upon motion in
compliance with CPLR 2214 or 2215 or upon the court's own initiative, after a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The form of the
hearing shall depend upon the nature of the conduct and the circumstances of the case.
Only one conforming change is made to this subsection. The
phrase referring to the imposition of sanctions is deleted. The Committee retained the provision of an opportunity for parties to move for
costs under the rule. Because the rule would permit only awards of
costs, rather than sanctions, it is necessary and desirable to allow the
victimized party to move for relief. That party should not be required
to rely on a judge who may be loath to raise such issues. Similarly, a
judge may wish to raise the abusive conduct question sua sponte to
protect a victimized party who may be loath to move for an award
because of concerns about damaging relations with an adversary or
the court and the climate for settling a dispute.
The ,problems of satellite litigation and abusive sanctions motions
encountered in the federal courts under Rule 11 should not arise
under revised Part 130. First, because the rule no longer covers frivolous pleadings, allowing for Monday-morning quarterbacking exercises, relatively fewer motions will be made. Second, the Committee
expects courts to aggressively monitor the making of motions under
Part 130, and to impose awards against attorneys who bring abusive
motions for costs.
The Committee recommends no changes in the language pertaining
to the opportunity to be heard. Because § 130-1.2 will be revised to
require judges making awards to be more specific as to what the abusive conduct is, it is unnecessary to be specific about the type of notice
and hearing. Awards will be reversed if the trial court fails to conduct
a hearing or to take affidavits that permit an accused attorney to re-
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spond to the required detailed recitation of wrongdoing. Affidavits
will be sufficient, so long as they are on personal knowledge. However, the court should hold oral hearings when necessary, especially if
a credibility issue is presented.
§ 130-1.2

-

Order Awarding Costs

The Committee proposes that § 130-1.2 be revised to provide:
The court may make an award of costs only upon a written decision setting forth the particulars of the conduct on which the
award is based, the reasons why the court found the conduct to be
abusive, and the reasons why the court found the amount awarded
to be appropriate. An award of costs shall be entered as a judgment of the court.
The caption of the subsection deletes the words "or Imposing Sanctions" to conform to the major revisions of Part 130. In addition to
the conforming changes to the text which substitute "abusive" for
"frivolous," and which delete the phrases pertaining to sanctions, the
text of this subsection is amended in two important respects.
First, the section requires courts to set forth in their written order
the particulars of the conduct undertaken which violated Part 130
and which justified the amount of costs awarded. The addition of the
phrase "particulars of the" conduct is necessary to prevent litigants
and the courts from imposing an award based on subjective factors
alone. Requiring the court to set forth the particulars should insure
that awards are not unfairly made, and will insure that a satisfactory
record for appellate review is maintained.
The case law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 has evolved
to require findings by the district court as to the specifics of the violation and the sanction awarded. The findings requirement has provided the federal appellate courts with a tool for preventing abusive
use of Rule 11, and the concept should be expressly incorporated into
Part 130.
Particularity also complements the due process requirements contained in § 130-1. 1(d). Requiring specificity in the order will result in
proper notice to the attorney and will minimize the chances of the
court making an improvident ruling.
The particularity requirement also applies to the court's award.
Part 130 permits an award of "actual expenses reasonably incurred
and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from abusive conduct."
Thus, the court must demonstrate that the award is for the victimized
party's actual expenses resulting from the abusive conduct. The rule
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is not an all-purpose fee-shifting device, rather it provides only for
reimbursement for the expenses caused by the abusive conduct.
The court must also demonstrate that the award is for expenses and
attorney's fees that are "reasonably incurred." The use of this phrase
makes it unnecessary to add an express duty of mitigation to the rule.
Only a victimized party who has mitigated will be able to recover its
total fees and expenses.
The subsection will continue to require an award to be entered as a
judgment of the court which will permit the offending party to take an
immediate appeal. Thus, the rule provides ample protection during
the course of the action or proceeding to seek review of an award.
The second major change to this subsection is to eliminate the cap
of $10,000. There are several significant problems with the cap, and
there is no real need for the cap because of other changes made to
Part 130.
The requirement that the court set forth with particularity the basis
for an award protects against arbitrary awards. The victim of an unfair award is unlikely to be appeased by the fact that there is some
limit on the Court's unfairness. In addition, the elimination of sanctions, which are difficult to quantify, removes one of the remaining
justifications for a cap. As a corollary, requiring the court to set forth
the particulars of an award, limited by the reasonableness requirement, prevents unfair awards.
The basic problem with the cap is that it permits unscrupulous lawyers or litigants to buy a license for abuse. Once the magic $10,000
threshold is met, the court will lose Part 130 as a tool to control abusive conduct. A well-financed party, for example, would be in a position to overwhelm a less well-off or impecunious adversary. Part
130's new emphasis on abusive conduct, instead of frivolous conduct,
also reduces the need to protect smaller firms from large awards. If
solo practitioners or others with lesser resources engage in abusive
conduct, they should not be able to hide behind inability to pay as an
excuse for continuing to harass their opponents.
§ 130-1.3 - Application to Officers Other than Judges of the Courts
of the Unified Court System
The Committee proposes that § 130-1.3 should now read:
The powers of a court set forth in this Part shall apply to judges
of the Housing Part of the New York City Civil Court and to hearing examiners appointed pursuant to section 439 of the Family
Court Act, except that the powers of Family Court hearing examiners shall be limited to a determination that a party or attorney
has engaged in abusive conduct, which shall be subject to confir-
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mation by a judge of the Family Court who may impose any costs
authorized by this Part.
The current text of this section is deleted. As discussed in the analysis of § 130-1.1, the Committee decided that sanctions were neither
necessary nor desirable. Compensatory awards provide a sufficient
deterrent to the abusive conduct proscribed by the rule.
In its place is the revised text of current § 130-1.4. Only conforming changes are made to new § 130-1.3. The word "frivolous" is
replaced with the word "abusive," and the phrase "or sanctions" is
deleted.
§ 130-1.4 - Exception
The revised text of this subsection has been moved to § 130-1.3. If
the legislature declines to repeal CPLR § 8303-a, the text of current
§ 130-1.5 will become § 130-1.4.

§ 130-1.5
Deleted.
IV.

Examples Illustrating the Operation of the Revised Rule

Examples illustrating the operation of the revised rule are set forth
in Appendix G.
V.

Potential Vehicles for Imposing Other Forms of
Costs and Sanctions

In making its recommendations, the Committee has recognized and
considered other forms of costs and sanctions which are currently
available in New York State. The Committee does not believe that
any of these costs and sanctions are viable alternatives to the measures
the Committee now recommends. The Committee has listed these
costs and sanctions in this section of its Report and has summarized
the reasons they are not useful in curtailing abusive conduct.
A.

CPLR Provisions

The CPLR contains various provisions for fees (Article 80), costs
(Articles 81 and 82), and disbursements and additional allowances
(Article 83). With the possible exception of CPLR 8303-a (discussed
hereinafter), the maximum amounts which may be awarded under
these provisions are not sufficient to address in a meaningful way the
problems of abusive conduct discussed in this Report. In addition,
statutory costs and disbursements are usually awarded automatically
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to the successful party in a lawsuit and may not be used to attempt to
control abusive conduct.
The CPLR section which might be expected to be most useful in
addressing abusive litigation conduct is CPLR Section 3126 which
provides "[p]enalties for refusal to comply with order or to disclose."
In particular, Section 3126 provides:

§ 3126.

PENALTIES FOR REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ORDER OR
TO DISCLOSE.

If any party, or a person who at the time a deposition is taken or
an examination or inspection is made, is an officer, director, member, employee or agent of a party or otherwise under a party's control, refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to
disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed, pursuant to notice duly served, the court may make such
orders with regard to the failure or refusal as are just, among them:
1. an order that issues to which the information is relevant
shall be deemed resolved for purposes of the action in accordance with the claims of the party obtaining the order;
or

2. an order prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting
or opposing designated claims or defenses, from producing
in evidence designated things or items of testimony, or
from introducing any evidence of the physical, mental or
blood condition sought to be determined, or from using
certain witnesses; or
3. an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing
the action or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by
*default against the disobedient party.
Judges are reluctant to apply thepenalties provided in CPLR 3126
because they are thought to result in prejudice to the client, not to the
lawyer, who is more likely to have been responsible for the improper
conduct. If judges will not use the section, it is obviously not a meaningful deterrent. In addition, even if the section was used, it would
often be inappropriately applied because it frequently would punish
the client for the sins of its lawyer.
B.

Attorney Disciplinary Procedures

The Committee considered the availability of attorney grievance or
disciplinary procedures pursuant to DR 7-102 (A)(1) and (2) as a possible alternative response to abusive conduct. The Committee concludes that such proceedings are not a viable alternative. There is a
distinct advantage to having an application relating to abusive litiga-
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tion conduct promptly adjudicated by the judge before whom the conduct occurred, rather than by a grievance or disciplinary committee
months or years later. In addition, attorney disciplinary proceedings
have not been an effective way to control abusive litigation conduct.
Much abusive conduct is arguably not violative of the disciplinary
rules but still should be curtailed.
C. Civil Contempt Proceedings Under the Judiciary Law
The Committee considered the availability of proceedings for civil
contempt under Section 751(1) of the Judiciary Law as a possible alternative response to abusive conduct. The Committee concluded
that such proceedings are rarely used in the context of abusive conduct and are inadequate for dealing with the abuses intended to be
covered by the Committee's recommendations.
VI. CPLR 8303-a
The Committee recommends that the New York Legislature consider whether CPLR Section 8303-a should be continued in view of
the revised thrust of Part 130. Certain of the conduct described in
Section 8303-a may be the subject of an award pursuant to revised
Part 130. In addition, Section 8303-a as drafted is applicable to a
limited class of cases. An abusive conduct standard should encompass all forms of cases. Finally, Section 8303-a inevitably results in
limitations on access to the courts. As set forth above, the Committee
believes that the Legislature should consider whether such limitations
are appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER
SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION
IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS
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Separate Statement of Stanley Futterman
I agree with all but one of the recommendations of the Committee,
including its endorsement of the appropriateness and importance of
court rules prohibiting abusive conduct in litigation. I disagree only
with the Committee's recommendation that the "objective" standard
for determining abusive conduct be deleted.
Part 130 of the Uniform Rules of the New York State Trial Courts
now prohibits attorney conduct in civil litigation when:
(i) it is completely without merit in law or fact and cannot be
supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; or
(ii) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of
the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another.
The first of these standards, which the Committee would eliminate,
looks at whether there is any "merit" to or "reasonable argument" for
a position taken in litigation. It holds lawyers as objective a standard
of conduct as has been devised, taken from the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and avoids the need to judge an attorney's motives.
I do not think the standard is too high. I believe it is one that those
who consider themselves members of a learned profession should welcome, both for themselves and for the responsible clients they serve.
The objective standard is intended to, and hopefully will, "chill"
conduct that is "completely without merit in law or fact and cannot
be supported by a reasonable argument.... " The Committee objects
that the standard may unintentionally freeze out imaginative claims
and theories. No one has identified for us, however, a single novel
claim or theory that has not been advanced because of Part 130 or any
of its federal or state counterparts.
The Committee's Report argues that a Brown v. Board of Education
claim filed in the wake of Plessy v. Ferguson might have been sanctioned by a federal judge under the objective standard. The argument
is an unpersuasive one for several reasons. First, it does an injustice
to the lawyering which went into the Brown challenge; while the merits of the Supreme Court's decision have been subjected to microscopic analysis, no responsible jurist, to my knowledge, has ever
suggested that the Brown proponents, or the first Mr. Justice Harlan,
who dissented in Plessy, did not present a "reasonable argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;" that much is
specifically protected by the existing wording of Part 130. If we cannot trust our judges to recognize a reasonable argument when they see
it, we cannot trust them to do anything.
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Second, references to federal constitutional rights can have only a
tangential relation to civil litigation in the state courts. The scope of
application of Part 130 embraces the humbler stuff of contracts, torts
and matrimonial litigation. There is less consequence to what may be
deterred and more justification for the shifting of costs.
Third, under the Committee's proposal to eliminate punitive sanctions, which I strongly support, no one can be punished for a theory
that may be judged too imaginative. All that may be involved is the
shifting of some of the huge expense of modern litigation - the real
chiller of resort to the courts - from the innocent and victorious
litigant to the losing party and/or attorney who has imposed additional expense through the assertion of a position "completely without
merit in law or fact ....

."

Anything less seems to me to be unjust.

Fourth, there is the collective judgment of other jurisdictions. Our
survey shows that of thirty-three jurisdictions (including the federal)
as to which we were able to acquire first-hand information, 29 employ
an objective standard akin to that in Part 130. One state, Idaho, goes
further and by statute authorizes its courts to award attorney fees in
any action that merits it, approaching the "English" rule which customarily shifts attorneys' fees from the winner to the loser. There are
good reasons to refrain from shifting costs automatically from winner
to loser, but not when the loser has been irresponsible.
Fifth, Part 130 is barely a year old. I do not believe we have accumulated the experience which would justify amputating one of its two
standards. I am concerned that to do so would send the wrong
message to New York's attorneys. For the good of their clients and
themselves, they should be asked how they can be more responsible,
not encouraged to think that next year they may be able to get away
with more than they think they can this year.
I recognize that the Committee has attempted to be responsive to
these concerns by noting that persistence in asserting a position after
its lack of merit has become obvious may be found to constitute "harassment." That approach seems to me inadequate, however. First,
judgments about a lawyer's or party's motives may be far more difficult to make than judgments about the objective basis for a position
taken in litigation. Courts will be reluctant, and properly so, to make
judgments of the former type. Moreover, I believe that the root problem is not so much harassment as irresponsibility. I do not think
many lawyers act out of malice; I do think many lawyers have diffi-

22

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XVIII

culty confessing to their clients that a position they have asserted has
been shown to be baseless and should be abandoned.
Stanley Futterman
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Appendix A
Members of the Special Committee to Consider Sanctions For
Frivolous Litigation in New York State Courts

Hon. Hugh R. Jones, Chair
Edward N. Costikyan
John R. Dunne
Hon. Herbert B. Evans
Stanley Futterman
Robert L. Haig
Henry G. Miller
Professor David D. Siegel
Professor Georgene M. Vairo
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Appendix B
Charge to Special Committee to Consider Sanctions For Frivolous
Litigation in New York State Courts
The Special Committee to Consider Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation in New York State Courts shall:
1. Study appropriate means for addressing problems caused by
frivolous litigation in the courts of New York State, including the
question of when sanctions should be imposed and the substantive
and procedural form they should take. As part of this study, the
Committee shall evaluate the appropriateness and effectiveness of
those measures already in place designed to control frivolous litigation, especially those procedures for the imposition of sanctions established by the Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Courts.
2. Prepare appropriate recommendations based on its study for
consideration by the House of Delegates. Such recommendations
may include, but are not limited to, amendment or expansion of the
existing court rules, or the formulation of such further rules, regulations or legislation as the Committee may deem appropriate.
3. To the extent practicable, conduct its deliberations in close coordination with other interested committees and sections of the
Association.
4. Make timely progress reports to the officers of the Association
and to the Executive Director and to submit its report and recommendations to the Executive Committee and the House of Delegates as
requested by the President.
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Lucian T. Pera, Esq.
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Appendix D
Summary of U.S. Jurisdictions' Approaches to the Problem of
Abusive Conduct in Litigation
Jurisdiction
Alabama

Stat.
X

Alaska
Arizona

Court
Rule

X

Subj.
Stand.

Object.
Stand.

Applic. to
Party
Atty.

Punitive
Sancts.

Cost
Shift.

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

to $500

X

X

X

X

X

X

-

to $5000

X

X

X

X

Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

X

X

Dist. of Col.
Florida

X

Georgia

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X(rule)

X
-

X

Hawaii
Idaho

gen'l
auth.

X

X(rule)

X

X

X(rule)

X

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

X

Kentucky
Louisiana

X
X

X(atty)

Maine
Maryland

X

X(atty)

X

Massachusetts

X

X(atty)

X(party)

Michigan

X

Minnesota

X

?

X

Mississippi

X

X(atty)

X

X

X

X(rule)

Missouri

X

X

Montana
Nebraska

X

X

X

X

Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

X
to $10,000

New York
N. Carolina
N. Dakota
Ohio

X

X

X

X

X(atty)

X(atty)
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Subj.
Stand.

Object.
Stand.

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Pennsylvania

X

X

X

X

X

X(atty)

Puerto Rico

X

X

X

X

X

X(atty)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X(atty)

-

X

X

X

X(atty)

X

X

X

X

Jurisdiction

Stat.

Oklahoma
Oregon

Court
Rule

Applic. to
Atty.
Party

Punitive
Sancts.

Cost
Shift.
X
X

Rhode Island
S. Carolina
S. Dakota
Tennessee

X

X

Texas

X

X

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

X

X

X(rule)

X

X

X(rule)

X

X

X

X

X

X

West Virginia
Wisconsin

X

Wyoming
Federal

TOTALS (33)

-

X

X

X

X

X

28

20

31

29

27

32

X

12
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Special Committee to Consider Sanctions
Materials Received From Other States Regarding
Sanctions
ALABAMA
Letter from Keith B. Norman, Alabama State Bar Director of Programs (Jan. 8, 1990).
Letter from Harlan I. Prater, IV (Jan. 9, 1990).
ALA. CODE §§ 12-19-270 to 12-19-276 (1990).
Continuing Legal Education outline prepared by Keith Norman pp. 209-13.
Cited but not included:
McArdle v. Bromfield, 540 So. 2d 91 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989).
ALASKA
Letter from Gregory G. Silvey (Jan. 12, 1990).
ALASKA CIVIL RULE 11 - Signing of pleading, motions and other
papers; sanctions.
ALASKA CIVIL RULE 95 Penalties.
ALASKA CIVIL RULE 82 - Attorney's fees.
Keen v. Ruddy, 784 P.2d 653 (Alaska 1989) (application of sanction

rules).
ARIZONA
Letter from Mark E. Hamelburg (Jan. 18, 1990).
Letter from Daniel J. McAuliffe, Chair, State Bar of Arizona Civil
Practice and Procedure Committee (Jan. 9, 1990).
ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 11 - Signing of pleadings.
ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 16(a) - Pretrial conferences.
ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26(f) - Signing of discovery requests.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (1989) - Recovery of attorney's
fees.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-349 (1989) - Unjustified actions.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-350 (1989) - Determination of award.
Boone v. Superior Court, 145 Ariz. 235, 700 P.2d 1335 (1985).
Gilbert v. Board of Med. Examiners, 155 Ariz. 169, 745 P.2d 617
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
Wright v. Hills, 161 Ariz. 538, 780 P.2d 416 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
Peters, Threat of Sanctions, 23 ARIZ. B.J. 19 (1987).
Sanctions and Punitive Fee Awards, ARIZONA ATTORNEY'S FEES
MANUAL (Arizona State Bar 1987).

1990]

FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION

ARKANSAS
Letter from William A. Martin, Arkansas Bar Association Executive
Director (n.d.).
Recommendations made by Arkansas Bar Association Committee on
Professionalism.
DELAWARE
Letter from Lawrence S. Drexler (Jan. 8, 1990).
Letter from David Pearl (Feb. 14, 1990).
DEL. CH. CT. R. 11 - Signing of pleadings.
DEL. CT. COM. PL. R. 11 - Signing of pleadings.
DEL. FAM. Cr. R. 11 - Signing of pleadings.
DEL. R. PROF. COND. 3.1 - Meritorious claims and contentions.
DEL. Sup. CT. R. 12 - Attorneys of record.
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 11 - Pleas.
Drexler, Amended Rule 11: A Sign of the Times, DELAWARE LAWYER 10

(Summer 1987).

FLORIDA
Letter from Paul F. Hill, General Counsel, The Florida Bar (Feb. 5,
1990).
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420 - Dismissal of actions.
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.442 - Offer of judgment.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.061 (1989) - Offers of settlement.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (1989) - Attorney's fee.
The Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
1.442 (Offer Judgment), 550 So. 2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
Berman and Cole, The New Offer of Judgment Rule in Florida: What
Does One Do Now?, FLA. B.J. 38 (1990).
Florida Bar Committee on Lawyer Professionalism, Professionalism:
A Recommitment of the Bench, the Bar, and the Law Schools of
Florida (May 1989).
GEORGIA
Letter from Bernard Taylor (Feb. 1, 1990).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-7-80 to 51-7-85 (1989) -

Abusive litigation.

IDAHO
Letter from David C. Nye (Jan. 4, 1990).
IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (1989) - Attorney's fees.
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 1l(a)(1) - Signing of pleadings, motions and other
papers.
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IOWA
Letter from Glenn Goodwin (Jan. 4, 1990).
Letter from Carl Nielsen, Executive Director of the Iowa State Bar
Association (Jan. 15, 1990).
IOWA R. Civ. P. 80 - Verification abolished; affidavits.
KANSAS
Letter from Mark Maloney (Jan. 5, 1990).
Letter from Ron Smith, Kansas Bar Association Legislative Counsel
(Jan. 3, 1990).
KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-211 - Signing of pleadings, motions and other
papers; liability for frivolous filings.
KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-2007 - Assessment of costs of frivolous claim,
defense or denial; liability of attorney, when.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3079 (1984) - Costs of frivolous claim or
action assessed against state agency; report; payment.
Rood v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 243 Kan. 14, 755 P.2d 502
(1988).
Leben, Rule 11 Sanctions: The Special Problem of Local Counsel, 52
J. KAN. B.A. 17 (1989).
KENTUCKY
Letter from Rita E. Williams (Mar. 8, 1990).
KY. R. Civ. P. 11.
Clark Equip. Co. v. Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
LOUISIANA
Letter from H. Alston Johnson, III (Jan. 8, 1990).
LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 863 - Signing of pleadings, effect.
LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1420 - Signing of discovery requests, responses, or objections.
MAINE
Letter from Ryan S. Stinneford (Feb. 8, 1990).
ME. BAR R. 3.1 - Scope and effect.
ME. BAR R. 3.7 - Improper legal action.
ME. BAR R. 7(e)(6)(A) - Commencement of attorney discipline
actions.
ME. R. Civ. P. 11 - Signing of pleadings and motions; sanctions.
ME. R. Civ. P. 16(h) - Pretrial procedure in the Superior Court;
sanctions.
ME. R. Civ. P. 16A - Pretrial procedure in the district court.
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ME. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) - Scope of discovery; trial preparation;
materials.
ME. R. Civ. P. 30(g) - Failure to attend or serve subpoena;
expenses.
ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h) - Depositions for use in foreign jurisdictions.
ME. R. Civ. P. 31 - Depositions upon written questions.
ME. R. Civ. P. 33(a) - Availability [of interrogatories]; procedures
for use.
ME. R. Civ. P. 34 - Production of documents and things.
ME. R. Civ. P. 36(a) - Request for admission.
ME. R. Civ. P. 37 - Failure to make discovery; sanctions.
ME. R. Civ. P. 41(d) - Costs of previously-dismissed action.
ME. R. Civ. P. 56(g) - Summary judgment; affidavits made in bad
faith.
ME. R. Civ. P. 76(f) - Record on appeal to the superior court; additional costs.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 851 (1989) - Information against
attorney.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1802 (1989) - Appeal found to be
frivolous.
MARYLAND
Letter from James Cathwood (Jan. 3, 1990).
Letter from Susan K. Gauvey (Feb. 8, 1990).
MD. R. 1-311 - Signing of pleadings and other papers.
MD. R. 1-341 - Bad faith; unjustified proceeding.
Needle v. White Mindel, Clarke & Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 568 A.2d
856 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
MASSACHUSETTS
Letter from Austin Broadhurst (Jan. 3, 1990).
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 211, § 10 (1989) - Frivolous appeals; costs and
interest (applies to appeals to Mass. Supreme Judicial Court).
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21 IA, § 15 (1989) - Frivolous appeals or exceptions; costs and interest.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 218, § 21 (1990) - Power to establish rules of
procedure; venue; jurisdictional amount; hearings; damages and
penalties.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 3 (1986) - Rules; power to make and promulgate (repealed 1975).
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 6F (1990) - Costs, expenses and interest
for insubstantial, frivolous or bad faith claims or defenses.
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MASS. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 6G (1990) -

Appeal; award of expenses for
frivolous or bad faith claims or defenses.
11 - Appearances and pleadings.
37 - Failure to make discovery; sanctions.
25 - Damages for delay.
MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 3:07 - Canons of ethics and disciplinary
rules regulating the practice of law [DRs 7-101 to 7-107].
MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 4:01 - Bar Discipline.
MASS. UNIFORM SMALL CLAIMS R. 7(e) - Costs.
Cited but not included:
Collins v. Godfrey, 324 Mass. 574, 87 N.E.2d 838 (1949).
Hahn ;. Planning Bd. of Stoughton, 403 Mass. 332, 529 N.E.2d
1334 (1988).
O'Coin's,Inc. v. Treasurerof the County of Worcester, 362 Mass.
507, 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972).
insubstantial,
MASS. R. Civ. P.
MASS. R. Civ. P.
MASS. R. APP. P.

MICHIGAN
Letter from Michael Karwiski, State Bar of Michigan Asst. Executive
Director for Administration (Jan. 2, 1990).
MICH. CT. R. 2.114 - Signatures of attorneys and parties; verification; effect; sanctions.
MICH. CT. R. 2.625 - Taxation of costs.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2591 (Callaghan 1988) - Frivolous civil
action or defense; awarding costs and fees to prevailing party;
assessing costs and fees against nonprevailing party and attorney.
MINNESOTA
Letter from Daniel Lillehaug (Jan. 30, 1989).
Amicus Brief of Minnesota State Bar Association, Uselman v.
Uselman, No. C9-89-1093 (Sup. Ct.) [opinion and date
unavailable].
Cited but not included:
MINN. R. CIv. P. 11 - Signing of pleadings, motions and other
papers; sanctions.
MINN. STAT. § 549.21 (1988) Reimbursement for certain
costs in civil actions.
MISSISSIPPI
Letter from Robert Pedersen (Feb. 14, 1990).
MISS. CODE ANN.

§§ 11-55-1 to 11-55-15 (Supp. 1990).

Miss. R. Civ. P. 11.
Cited but not included:
Robertson, Discovering Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of
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Civil Procedure, 8 Miss. C.L. REV. 111 (1988).
MISSOURI

Letter from Keith A. Birkes (Feb. 21, 1990).
Letter from Linda J. Salfrank (Jan. 8, 1990).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 514.205 (1989) - Frivolous suit, consequences of
filing; limitations.
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.03 - Pleadings, motions, and other papers to be
signed, by whom; sanctiois.
Mo. Sup. CT. R. 84.19 - Damages for frivolous appeals.
Gray, Sanctions Against Attorneys for Frivolous Filings, 42 J. OF Mo.
B. 391 (1986).
NEBRASKA
Letter from Norman Wright (Feb. 20, 1990).
NEB. REV. STAT.

NEB. REV. STAT.

§§

25-824 to 25-824.03 (1989).

§ 25-1711

(1989).

NEW MEXICO
Letter from Linda McDonald, State Bar of New Mexico Executive
Director (Jan. 9, 1990).
N.M. STAT. ANN. R. 1-011 - Signing of pleadings, motions and
other papers; sanctions.
Seminar, Rule 11, Other Sanctions and Ethical Considerationsfor the
Litigator, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION HANDBOOK (Feb.
11, 1989).
NORTH CAROLINA
Letter from Marshall Gallop, Chair, Litigation Section, North Carolina Bar Association (Jan. 10, 1990).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.5 - Attorney's fees in nonjusticiable cases.
Cited but not included:
N.C. R. CIV. P. 11 [conforming to FED. R. CIV. P. 11].
OHIO
Letter from Albert Bell, General Counsel, Ohio State Bar Association
(Jan. 27, 1989).
Letter from Robert B. Preston (Jan. 8, 1990).
Memorandum from Arter & Hadden (Jan. 8, 1990).
GOVERNING BAR R. V, § 7 - Manner of Discipline.
OHIO R. CIV. P. 11

-

Signing of pleadings.

Border City Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Moan, 15 Ohio St. 3d 65, 472 N.E.2d
350 (1984).
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Mitchell v. Whitaker, 33 Ohio App. 3d 170, 514 N.E.2d 937 (1986).
State ex rel. Fant v. Sykes, 29 Ohio St. 3d 65, 505 N.E.2d 966 (1987).
Stevens v. Kiraly, 24 Ohio App. 3d 211, 494 N.E.2d 1160 (1985).
OKLAHOMA
Letter from Gary W. Catron (Jan. 4, 1990).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 941 (1988) Actions by state entities.
Court costs, witness fees and attorney fees.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2012 (1989) - Defenses and objections. When
and how presented. By pleading or motion.
OREGON
Letter from Jeffrey W. Knapp (Jan. 17, 1990).
Letter of George A. Riemer, General Counsel, Oregon State Bar (Jan.
30, 1990).
OR. CIv. P. § 19.160 - Damages upon affirmance of judgment.
OR. CIV. P. § 20.105 - Attorney fees where party disobeys court
order or asserts claim in bad faith or for oppressive reasons.
OR. CIv. P. § 20.125 - Assessment of costs against attorney causing
mistrial.
OR. R. App. P. 1.40 - Verification [adopting OR. R. Civ. P. 17].
OR. R. Civ. P. 17 - Signing of pleadings, motions and other papers;
sanctions.
OR. R. Civ. P. 21(E) - Motion to strike.
OR. R. Civ. P. 46 - Failure to make discovery; sanctions.
Comment, Courts Are No Place For Fun and Frivolity: A Warning to
Vexatious Litigants and Over-Zealous Attorneys, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 441 (1984).
PENNSYLVANIA
Letter from Louise Lamoreaux, Pennsylvania Bar Association Ethics
Coordinator (Jan. 28, 1989).
PA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.1 - Meritorious claims and contentions.
PUERTO RICO
Letter from Antonio Escudero-Viera (Jan. 23, 1990).
P.R. R. Civ. P. 9 - Signing of papers.
P.R. R. Civ. P. 44.1 - Costs and attorney fees.
P.R. R. Civ. P. 44.2 - Interlocutory costs and penalties upon the
parties.
P.R. R. Civ. P. 44.3 - Legal interest.
P.R. R. Civ. P. 52.2 - Frivolous appeals.
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SOUTH CAROLINA
Letter from Linda Lemel (Jan. 23, 1990).
S.C. R. Civ. P. 11 (a) - Signature of attorney or party.
S.C. R. Civ. P. 11 (b) - Improper signing.
TENNESSEE
Letter from Gilbert Campbell, Executive Director, Tennessee Bar Association (Jan. 3, 1990).
Letter from Lucian T. Pera (Mar. 2, 1990).
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-122 (1980) - Damages for frivolous
appeal.
TENN. CODE. ANN.

§ 29-26-116 (1980)

-

Statute of limitations;

counterclaim for damages.
TENN. R. Civ. P. 11 - Signing of pleadings, motions and other papers; sanctions [with comments].
TENN. R. Civ. P. 26 - General provisions governing discovery.
TENN. R. Civ. P. 37 - Failure to make or to cooperate in discovery;
sanctions.
TENN. R. Civ. P. 41 - Dismissal of actions.
TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.07 - Affidavits made in bad faith.
Cited but not included:
TENN. R. Civ. P. 11 [identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 11].
TEXAS
Letter from Linda Acevedo, State Bar of Texas Asst. General Counsel
(Jan. 29, 1990).
TEX. STAT. tit. 2, § 9.011 - Signing of pleadings.
TEX. STAT. tit. 2, § 9.012 - Violations; sanction.
TEXAS R. Civ. P. ANN. § III - Advocate [includes Rule 3.01 (Meritorious claims and contentions) and Rule 3.04 (Fairness in adjudicatory proceedings)].
WASHINGTON
Letter from John H. Binns, Jr. (Jan. 16, 1989).
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.185 (1990) - Prevailing party to receive
expenses for opposing frivolous action or defense.
WASH. Civ. R. 11 - Signing of pleadings, motions and legal memoranda; sanctions.
WISCONSIN
Letter from Dan Conley (Jan. 16, 1990).
Letter from Edgar Lien, State Bar of Wisconsin Government Relations Director (Jan. 10, 1990).

42

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
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Signing of pleadings, motions and
other papers; sanctions.
WIS. STAT. § 814.025 (1988) -, Costs upon frivolous claims and
counterclaims.
Wis. Sup. CT. R. 20:3.1 - Meritorious claims and contentions.
Matter of Lauer, 108 Wis. 2d 746, 324 N.W.2d 432 (1982).
Matter of Cairo, 115 Wis. 2d 5, 338 N.W.2d 702 (1983).
Gabler, Isn't That Motion Frivolous, Counsel?, WIs. BAR BULL. 17
(Dec. 1988).
(Revised 3/15/90)
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Appendix E
Part 130 Costs and Sanctions*
SUBPART 130-1. AWARDS OF COSTS [AND IMPOSITION OF
FINANCIAL SANCTIONS] FOR [FRIVOLOUS] ABUSIVE
CONDUCT IN CIVIL LITIGATION

§ 130-1.1

-

COSTS [; SANCTIONS] for Abusive Conduct.

(a) The court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except where
prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting
from [frivolous] abusive conduct as defined in this Part. [In addition
to or in lieu of awarding costs, the court, in its discretion may impose
financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct as defined in this Part,
which shall be payable as provided in section 130.3 of this Part.] This
Part shall not apply to town or village courts, to proceedings in a
small claims part of any court, or to proceedings in the Family Court
commenced under Article 3, 7, 8 or 10 of the Family Court Act.
(b) The court, as appropriate, may make such award of costs [or
impose such financial sanctions] against either an attorney or a party
to the litigation or against both. Where the award [or sanction] is
against an attorney, it may be against the attorney personally or upon
a partnership, firm, corporation, government agency, prosecutor's office, legal aid society or public defender's office with which the attorney is associated and that has appeared as the attorney of record. The
award [or sanctions] may be imposed upon any attorney appearing in
the action or upon any attorney appearing in the action or upon a
partnership, firm or corporation with which the attorney is associated.
(c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is [frivolous] abusive if [:]
[(i) it is completely without merit in law or fact and cannot be
supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law; or]
[(ii)] it is undertaken or omitted primarily to delay or prolong unreasonably the resolution of the litigation[,] or to harass or maliciously injure another[.]
[Frivolous conduct shall] and may include the making of a [frivolous] motion for costs [or sanctions] under this section. In determining whether the conduct [undertaken was frivolous] in question is
* For ease of reference, a legislative format has been used with deletions denoted by
brackets and additions by italics.
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abusive, the court shall consider[, among other issues, (1) the circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct; and (2)]
whether [or not] the conduct was continued [when it lacks legal or
factual basis] after its impropriety was apparent or should have been
apparent to counsel.
(d) An award of costs [or the imposition of sanctions] may be
made either upon motion in compliance with CPLR 2214 or 2215 or
upon the court's own initiative, after reasonable opportunity to be
heard. The form of the hearing shall depend upon the nature of the
conduct and the circumstances of the case.
§ 130-1.2 - ORDER AWARDING COSTS [ OR IMPOSING SANCTIONS].
The court may make an award of costs [or impose sanctions or
both] only upon a written decision setting forth the particularsof the
conduct on which the award [or imposition] is based, the reasons why
the court found the conduct to be [frivolous] abusive, and the reasons
why the court found the amount awarded [or imposed] to be appropriate. An award of costs [or the imposition of sanctions or both]
shall be entered as a judgment of the court. [In no event shall the
total amount of costs awarded and sanctions imposed exceed $10,000
in any action or proceeding.]
[§ 130-1.3 - PAYMENT OF SANCTIONS.
Payments of sanctions by an attorney shall be deposited with the
Clients' Security Fund established pursuant to section 97-t of the
State Finance Law. Payments of sanctions by a party who is not an
attorney shall be deposited with the clerk of the court for transmittal
to the State Commissioner of Taxation and Finance.]
§ 130-1[.4].3 - APPLICATION TO OFFICERS OTHER THAN JUDGES
OF THE COURTS OF THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM.

The powers of a court set forth in this Part shall apply to judges of
the Housing Part of the New York City Civil Court and to hearing
examiners appointed pursuant to section 439 of the Family Court
Act, except that the powers of Family Court hearing examiners shall
be limited to a determination that a party or attorney has engaged in
[frivolous] abusive conduct, which shall be subject to confirmation by
a judge of the Family Court who may impose any costs [or sanctions]
authorized by this Part.
§ 130-1.[5].4 - EXCEPTION.
This rule shall not apply to requests for costs or attorneys' fees subject to the provisions of CPLR 8303-a.
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Appendix F
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Amended August 1, 1987)
RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND OTHER PA-

Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall
be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule
in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of
the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
PERS: SANCTIONS.
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Appendix G
Illustrations of Expense Awards for Abusive Conduct
The following are examples of how the Committee's proposed revision would work in a number of diverse situations based both on hypotheticals and on the reexamination of cases decided under the
original Part 130. "Award" and "expenses" are used to mean the
actual expenses, including attorneys' fees, to which abusive conduct
has put an opposing party. Neither term includes a punitive sanction.
1. In a suit by R against former employee E, R deposes E. The
deposition consists solely of marking the documents found in E's office. These are marked one by one and R's attorney announces his
intention so to proceed with the marking of 4000 documents. There is
no issue as to which of the documents or their contents are relevant.
E and his lawyer leave the deposition. R moves to make E attend a
new deposition, just to conti. tue the marking of the papers. The court
denies the motion. Some six weeks of delay results.
Expenses should be made against R for the time spent on the deposition and on the motion and for any other costs demonstrably suffered by E's side because of the delay.
2. A case with some dozen claims is on the ready trial calendar. P
then moves for leave to file a supplemental complaint to add four
more claims and to take further depositions in Europe. Based on P's
factual assertions, which prove untrue, the motion is granted. The
ensuing depositions delay the trial another six months.
The depositions show the falsity of P's allegations. Even so, P
presses the four claims, withdrawing them only at the close of his
case, in the face of D's motion to dismiss.
An award should be made to D for the expenses incurred after it
became clear that the facts on which P's motion was granted were
untrue. The award would include the cost of trying those four claims.
And if P cannot show good faith in initially believing true the facts on
which the motion was predicated, D's expenses in conducting the depositions would be another element included in the award.
3. Depositions are scheduled. D asks P to agree to adjourn the
depositions, but P declines. D then moves for summary judgment
(CPLR 3212) or to dismiss (CPLR 3211), just to get the automatic
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stay of discovery that CPLR 3214 works on such a motion. When the
motion is denied as wholly meritless, P's expenses incurred in the delay and in resisting the motion would be imposed on D.
4. X's attorney, A, objects to every other question at a deposition,
refusing to let the client answer despite rulings by the judge requiring
answers and instructing the attorney to save all objections (except
those as to mere form) for the trial.
Expenses should be imposed on A.
5. X's attorney, A, has been told by the judge not to mention anything about Y's alleged drunkeness at the time of the event in issue.
After a four-week trial, A asks a witness if it isn't a fact that Y was
drunk at the time in question. A mistrial is declared.
An award should be made against A. But it would be compensatory only. No punitive damages could be imposed. Contrast Deacon's
Bench, Inc. v. Hoffman, No. 87-0647 (Sup. Ct., Schenectady County
May 2, 1989) (Doran, J.).
6. P, groundlessly refusing to pay rent, has compelled several
landlords to bring a series of summary proceedings. P has also
brought several supreme court proceedings to stay the summary proceedings in the lower courts. In the latest supreme court proceeding,
all of this comes to the fore.
An award should be made against P, but for expenses only, and
only for expenses incurred by the adverse party in the present proceeding. A punitive sanction would be precluded. Contrast Winters v.
Gould, 143 Misc. 2d 44, 539 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct., New York
County 1989).
7. P, with litigious history, lost a certificate for two shares of
stock and asked the corporation to replace it. As was their right, the
corporate officials demanded a bond of P. Vindictively, P sued to remove them as officers.
If the court finds that the action was brought with malice, to injure
the defendants, it should impose an award of expenses against P. But
the costs of other similar suits brought by P earlier could not be part
of the award, even though the court could consider such other suits in
deciding whether P's bringing the present suit was malicious. Con-
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trast Martin-Trigona v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 145 Misc. 2d 405,
546 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1989).
8. On an ordinary and clear money claim, D interposes a groundless denial and defense, unreasonably delays a deposition, and makes
numerous groundless motions, all of which fail. An award can be
made against D for the delays and for the groundless motions, but not
merely for the interposition of the denial or defense. Compare Superior MerchandiseElectronics Co. v. Kent Import Export Co., N.Y.L.J.,
July 11, 1989, at 21, col. 2 (Davis, J.).
9. D moves to strike various paragraphs from an extended complaint because the complaint is too detailed. The court learns that in
another action the same firm objected to another plaintiff's complaint
as too inadequate. Upon a finding that the motion is intended to harass or delay, an award can be made against D. Here, too, D's conduct
in the other case can be considered, but the award can cover only the
expenses P incurs in the present action.
10. By "audible comments, facial expressions and gestures," P's
lawyer, A, manifests "a persistent pattern ... of attempted intimidation and disrespect," wasting the time of D and of a physician that D
has subpoenaed. An award made to D can include a sum for the
physician's wasted time, but no punitive sanction may be imposed.
Compare Weltz v. Urban Raiff & Sons, Inc., No. H-42259 (Sup. Ct.,
Erie County Dec. 5, 1989) (Joslin, J.).
11. In a matrimonial action in which the judge has made a full
equitable distribution and instructed the parties that they would
therefore be required to sustain their own attorney's fees, W nevertheless moves against H for attorney's fees. A compensatory award can
be made against W, payable to H's side for its expenses in opposing
the motion, but no punitive sanction may be imposed. Compare
Smerling v. Smerling, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1989, at 22, col. 3 (Glen, J.).
12. F, respondent in a paternity proceeding, denies paternity, asks
for a DNA test, and, when the court allows it, himself moves to stop
it, citing to the court a superseded statute favorable to F's position
after having cited the proper updated statute in earlier papers in the

1990]

FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION

proceeding. F can be required to pay such expenses as the other side
has sustained, but not punitive sanctions. Contrast Van Norden v.
Schindler, 144 Misc. 2d 771, 545 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct., Queens
County 1989).
13. Lawyer L, the friend of lawyer F in the paternity proceeding
set forth in Example 12, lets F put L's name on all the papers in the
case. No punitive sanction can be imposed on L, but if L was aware
of F's dilatory purpose, the award of expenses could of course run
against L as well as F. Contrast, again, the Van Norden case cited in
Example 12.
14. After venue in an action brought in New York County is
changed to Schenectady, and the order changing venue is affirmed by
the appellate division, the change is made and P's lawyer, L, saying
nothing about the previous proceedings, moves in the same action,
now in Schenectady, to change the venue back to New York County.
L can be made to pay the expenses of the opposing parties in resisting the latest motion. But a punitive sanction would not be allowed. Contrast Bossone v. General Electric Co., No. 87-1462 (Sup.
Ct., Schenectady County Feb. 21, 1990) (Doran, J.).
15. P, a bank, mistakenly pays D twice for the same thing and
sues to recover the second payment. D puts in a denial. P sends copies of the cancelled checks showing D's lawyer the double payment
and evidencing that there is no issue of fact. If D now persists in
contesting, and P moves for summary judgment, D can be made to
pay the expenses of the motion. Here the award is being made not for
the mere interposition of the denial, but for D's pressing it in the face
of evidence manifesting its groundlessness.*
If P did not so move, instead taking unnecessary pretrial steps, a
later resolution of the case in P's favor would justify an award of expenses only for the cost of summary judgment motion but not for the
later steps, which would not have been reasonably incurred. The use
of "reasonably" in the rule requires also a reasonable effort by a party
to mitigate its own expenses in the face of abusive conduct by the
other side.
* See and compare Ulster Savings Bank v. Wolf (Sup. Ct., Ulster Co. Oct. 18, 1989)
(Votg, J.) [citation and opinion unavailable].

